If you start listening to a Lithuanian media programme about the economy's future and possible actions, you can switch it off immediately. The Lithuanian government is powerless unless it can put a thin pillow under the worsening crisis. You will hurt yourself, but hopefully not fatally. With Germany at the forefront, the big EU countries have started a march to live frugally, even down to toilet paper. How are we different?
I remember as a teenager, there was always a wall calendar of the previous year hanging in the outside toilet. You could read it, and it was useful in other ways.
Although the answers are predictable, the current coalition will be asked many awkward questions. And interpellations of ministers. But the Foreign Minister is already laughing about it in advance.
Society and politics have their laws, such as the law that the last one to laugh gets the last laugh.
I am about 70% sure that the current rulers will lose the next parliamentary elections. But who will replace them, or rather who will be the leader, is completely unclear.
The political group led by Skvernelis has a good chance. I write "political" out of inertia, but it will have neither a programme nor a plan for organising the future life of the state.
During the election campaign, it will proclaim its sincere desire to help the population out of the crisis, which will be enough.
Lithuania's foreign policy will not change who replaces the current Foreign Minister. It will not change as long as the EU project exists, as long as Lithuania's commitments to it exist, and as long as there is not a separate European security structure alongside NATO. However, those who are born now may see one.
The economic model will not change with any political force in power for decades. As a result, relations with Russia will be maintained only by a thin diplomatic line of consular affairs.
Relations with China will depend on the attitude of the US towards its main economic competitor.
By the way, there is a country three times the size of Lithuania in terms of population, Belarus, whose dictator does not seem to be rushing to Russia's aid on the Ukrainian front and who, after extending the visa-free regime until the end of the year, is tempting the Lithuanian population with cheaper petrol and alcohol.
Despite warnings from the relevant Lithuanian authorities about the risk of being recruited, the latter are visiting the authoritarian state intensively, several times more often than last year. And what will happen when prices start to climb?
Poland, which has not adopted the euro, is not slowing down either. By the way, it has interesting interests in Ukraine. It is now a military transit country for the West into Ukraine, and Polish volunteers are fighting for Ukraine, but the privileges for the Poles in Lviv raise additional questions, even in the political sphere.
There are also questions about the future of Ukraine if we distance ourselves from the daily reports in the Lithuanian media about its achievements on the front line. Of course, victories need to be announced, but the reality of the situation usually becomes clear after a week.
Battle reports are part of the information war with their own addresses and style.
Moscow reports in the recognisable 'TASS authorised to report' style, while the reports of Mr Zelensky and his spokesmen are full of metaphors, appeals and even visions. Apparently, this is linked to Mr Zelensky's profession as an actor.
However, I wonder what the internal political situation in Ukraine is like. Before Mr Zelensky became President, the political struggle there was fierce. The oligarchs - pro-Russian, pro-Western, pro-Russian.
They amassed their wealth, as they have throughout post-Soviet history, in a time of savage capitalism, economic chaos, rustling, theft of arms and the parcelling of out-of-state assets. According to Ukraine's own political analysts, corruption flourished and continues to flourish.
Finally, in 2014, those in power brought the country to the brink of bankruptcy. Maidan began. Russian economic and military (Crimea) interests became intertwined. We are now seeing how those interests are materialising.
The Kremlin's plan to have a second Belarus in its backyard does not seem to have worked. It is difficult to say what the final "product" will be. The territory occupied by Russia is not shrinking. Ukrainian administrative politicians, oligarchs and new 'street' actors now have a common enemy, and to go to war with each other would be to throw water on the occupier's mill.
But old political struggles do not rust, no matter how much time passes. It is no secret that anti-Putin, anti-Russian politicians in Ukraine are also sharply critical of Mr Zelensky. His only merit is considered to be that he stayed in the country at the most difficult time.
On all other issues, especially the situation on the front line, fierce discussions are reportedly taking place behind the scenes.
It would be strange if Moscow's intelligence services did not try to record what was going on in Ukraine's political inner kitchen.
It is not without reason that former Russian President Medvedev announced scenarios for the near future. There are one and a half of them. One is Ukraine's full acceptance of Russia's terms, and half of the second is an internal coup in Ukraine, followed by acceptance of Russia's demands.
For its part, Ukrainian intelligence, through the mouths of political analysts, is reporting a coup in the making within the Kremlin itself. In short, there will be plenty to write about.
