According to the latest data from the Department of Statistics, the total fertility rate in Lithuania reached 1.34 last year. I would remind you that this indicator refers to the average number of children a woman of childbearing age has.
In 2020, the total fertility rate was 1.48, while in 2012–2019, it fluctuated between 1.6 and 1.7; in some years, it was as high as 1.74 (2015) (see graph). This was remarkable, both in terms of looking back at the period since 1990 and in terms of comparison with other countries, even Scandinavia or France, which typically have higher fertility rates than other EU countries.
In 2021, the total fertility rate fell by 17 percentage points compared to 2019 and by nine percentage points compared to 2020.
Four thousand fewer babies
The fertility situation in 2021 is somewhat different when looking at the absolute number of births. In 2019, which marks the end of a relatively high fertility period, 27 393 newborns were added to the population of Lithuania, compared to 23 330 the previous year, which is 4 063 fewer, or 15% less.
The situation in 2021 brings us back to the early 2000s when Lithuania was experiencing an unprecedented fertility „trough“. Between 2000 and 2007, the fertility rate fluctuated around 1.2–1.3. The painful consequences of this period are already showing up today in the declining number of pupils, potential and current students, the need to adapt educational infrastructure, etc.
They will also carry over into the future, when the generation of young women born during this period, which has been further cut back by emigration, will enter childbearing age, start working, paying taxes, etc. The associated programmed population decline and ageing of the population should also be mentioned. However, it is too early to say whether the fertility decline that began in 2020 and is continuing, as it did last year, will be sustained and when and how the bottom will be reached. However, the reasons for this are already under consideration.
In Latvia and Estonia, birth rates have been stable, unlike in Lithuania
Intuition would suggest that last year's fertility is a consequence of the COVID-19 pandemic. Although, at the beginning of the pandemic, there was speculation on social media about a pending baby boom, demographers were sceptical and did not support this view. The effect of previous pandemics and major natural disasters on fertility is usually restrictive rather than promotive.
However, emerging data from EU countries show that the first two years of a pandemic have had different effects on fertility. In 2021, fertility in some countries had risen slightly (France, Germany, Finland, Hungary), while in others, it has risen quite significantly (e.g. the Czech Republic, which has recorded its highest total fertility rate since 1992). Even in neighbouring Latvia and Estonia, last year was marked by stability (see graph). However, Lithuania's fertility curve puts us on a par with the countries where fertility declined during the pandemic.
So what happened in Lithuania? Sound arguments require detailed data and analysis of the data to understand what is happening in Lithuanian families and why. Especially since the generation that was born and grew up in independent Lithuania is entering the active phase of family building, although there is a lack of such data, some hypothetical explanations can be considered.
Lithuanians tend to have children within marriage
Although cohabitation outside marriage is common, it is not until one decides to have children or starts to have children. Lithuania's children born out of wedlock is around 25%. If we compare it with the situation a decade or two ago, it is decreasing. In the context of other countries, the share of children born out of wedlock is very low (for comparison, the share of children born out of wedlock in Estonia was 58% in 2021).
In Lithuania, marriage is still the main precondition for children. Despite all the new social and cultural winds of family life, we have remained a society where the social and symbolic meaning of marriage has hardly wavered. In 2020, the total rate of first marriages was at a record low (by the way, similar to 2000–2005).
The pandemic constraints are likely to have encouraged some potential newlyweds to postpone the registration of their marriage, which in turn has led them to postpone having children. Thus, paradoxically, our social conservatism has acted as a factor limiting fertility in this case. However, this argument would be positive news, as it would allow us to expect a compensatory effect on fertility in the near future.
The decline in housing affordability is very likely to hit young people hardest
If marriage is a prerequisite for having children, housing is a prerequisite for marriage. The prize for breaking the housing barrier is marriage – this is the established cultural logic of the life path. According to the Bank of Lithuania, in 2021, the rate of house price growth was the fastest since 2007, while the housing affordability index has been stagnating for the last few years. The decline in housing affordability is very likely to hit young people the hardest. They are having to spend more and more time stamping their feet on the housing barrier, which has a corresponding impact on their decisions to start a family. Given the dominance of the private sector in the housing market in Lithuania, it would be difficult to expect a positive breakthrough here.
A decline in the share of first children may be a bad sign
In 2021, the number of first births was at a record low. Only 43% of births took place, compared to a share of first births hovering around 47–48% for the past two decades. 2021 continued the downward trend in the share of first births since 2018 and is no longer indicative of a pandemic effect. The share of second births was similar to the previous five-year period, while the share of third births increased slightly.
Overall, the long-term trend for second births is not a simple one: their share of all births has risen steadily since 2000. However, the declining share of first children may be a bad sign. It indicates that some women are not entering motherhood, either postponing it to a later age or abandoning it altogether.
Between 2011 and 2021, the share of women not giving birth has been rising in the 30–34 and 35–39 age groups, as shown by the last two General Population Censuses. Of course, there is hope that they will still have children, but to a lesser extent than the older generation, especially as the proportion of women in the 40–44 and 45–49 age groups who have not given birth has increased between Censuses.
Thus, if demographers have been saying for years that the problem with Lithuania's fertility is the birth of second and subsequent children, it seems that we have entered a phase where the birth of the first child is becoming a demographic problem. This would no longer be a short-term issue but a fundamental factor that would have a lasting impact on the future of fertility.
Postponing the desire to have children
Optimistically, we can expect that the decline in the fertility curve in 2020 and 2021 is only short-term. This is a response to the uncertainties caused by the pandemic and the economic problems. In the summer of 2021, a representative survey of 30–34-year-olds carried out by myself and colleagues showed that a quarter of young people who were planning to have children had postponed their plans until the future.
Those who are more economically vulnerable, those with lower educational attainment, and those who have declared financial difficulties were significantly more likely to have postponed childbearing. Although it is not only Lithuania that has faced economic uncertainties, it is likely that social policy safeguards have worked more effectively in other countries.
It is therefore clear that we have entered a new demographic phase of fertility, which does not bode well. While part of the reasons for the current situation is linked to the pandemic, there are other, more fundamental demographic and social factors. Minimising their impact requires both more research and more informed public policy decisions.
